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Financial globalization, defined as global linkages through 
cross-border financial flows, has become increasingly 
relevant for emerging markets as they integrate financially 
with the rest of the world. This paper argues that, because 
of the way it is often measured, it has also led to the 
misperception that financial globalization in emerging 
markets has been growing in recent years. The authors 
characterize the evolution of financial globalization in 
emerging markets using alternative measures, and find 
that, in the 2000s, financial globalization has grown only 
marginally and international portfolio diversification has 
been limited and declining over time. The paper revisits 
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the empirical literature on the implications of financial 
globalization for local market deepening, international 
risk diversification, financial contagion, and financial 
dollarization, and finds them to be rather limited. 
Whereas financial globalization has indeed fostered 
domestic market deepening in good times, it has yielded 
neither the dividends of consumption smoothing (in line 
with limited portfolio diversification) nor the costs of 
amplifying global financial shocks. In turn, financial de-
dollarization has largely reflected the undoing of financial 
offshoring and the valuation effects of real appreciation. 
Financial globalization in emerging economies: 
 
Much ado about nothing? 
 
 




























JEL classification codes: F30, F36, G15, G01 
 
Keywords: financial globalization; international finance; emerging markets; financial 
development; portfolio risk sharing; financial stability; systemic currency mismatches 
                                                           
1Eduardo Levy Yeyati: UTDT and Brookings Institution. Tomas Williams: UTDT. The paper borrows heavily from 
the material prepared for a study on Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead, 
produced by the World Bank´s Chief Economist Office for the LAC region, and benefitted from comments by Tito 
Cordella, Sergio Schmukler, and seminar participants at the World Bank and HEID. Excellent research assistance 
from Mariana Barrera is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. 1.  Introduction 
 
Financial globalization (FG), understood as the deepening of cross border capital flows 
and asset holdings, has become increasingly relevant for the developing world for a number of 
reasons, including the consequences of its changing composition on countries´ balance sheets, its 
role in the transmission of global financial shocks, its benefits in terms of financial development, 
international risk sharing and business cycle smoothing, and the implication of all of the above 
for macroeconomic and prudential policies. In  this paper, we focus on these issues from  an 
empirical  perspective,  building  on,  updating,  and  specializing  the  existing  literature  to 
characterize the evolution and implications of FG in emerging economies. 
 
As conventional wisdom has it, the globalization process has been growing steadily since 
the mid-1980s, particularly in developing countries (Kose et al, 2010) and has accelerated in the 
2000s, with a dramatic increase in cross-border portfolio flows as a fraction of global wealth 
(Karolyi, 2010). However, this pattern depends on the measure of FG –usually proxied in the 
literature by the average of cross border assets and liabilities over GDP (FG-to-GDP ratios). As 
we show in the first part of the paper, a more natural normalization of foreign holdings by host 
market size (to control for financial market deepening and spurious relative price effects) reveals 
a more stable FG pattern during the 2000s.
2 In turn, normalizing foreign portfolio asset holdings 
by total portfolio holdings by residents show that, despite the growing FG ratios, international 
portfolio diversification in the emerging world are still remarkably low, and have remained 
stable or declined. 
 
The second part of the paper is devoted to the costs and benefit s of FG in emerging 
economies, an elusive subject that has produced conflicting results in the literature. FG has been 
associated with the deepening of local markets (in terms of credit to the private sector, and equity 
market capitalization) with varied s uccess: the literature has found a posit ive influence from 
market depth to FG (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Kose et al., 2010) and vice versa (Baltagi, 
Demetriades and Law, 2008). Identification of causality is furth er complicated by the choice of 
the time window: as (Mishkin, 2007) notes, while entry of foreign capital and institutions may 
improve  domestic  financial  markets  conditions  through  greater  competition  and  liquidity, 
financial crises could end up blurring this link.  We  revisit this evidence  controlling for the 
endogeneity bias, and find that there is indeed a positive effect, that works through market -
specific channels (e.g., foreign equity liabilities help deepen local equity markets rather than 
financial markets as a whole). 
 
In turn, empirical evidence on the link between FG and consumption smoothing has 
shown mixed results at best. On the one hand, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) report an increase 
in risk sharing for European countries in the early 1990s, when FG advanced significantly 
(although  their  result  may  be  dependent  on  the  specific  subsamples  used)  and  Artis  and 
Hoffmann (2006) argue that financial globalization improves risk sharing in the long term. On 
the other hand, Bai and Zhang (2005) analyze a two period sample, 1973 -1985 and 1986-1998, 
                                                           
2Relative price effects arise from the fact that the standard ratio implicitly compares nominal output and outstanding 
financial holdings. Thus, for example, an equity market boom raises the equity FG-to-GDP ratio regardless of 
changes in portfolio composition. To the extent that cross-border debt liabilities are denominated in hard currency, 
the same applies to debt FG ratios in the event of a real depreciation. for advanced and developing economies, and showed that although according to their measure 
FG  doubles  from  period  to  period,  there  is  no  substantial  improvement  in  international  risk 
sharing. In the same vein, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) discuss the theoretical advantages 
of FG in terms of international risk sharing as a way to hedge consumption against domestic 
income shocks, but find that only advanced economies have reaped those benefits so far.  
 
We  examine the risk sharing benefits  of FG  from  a  critical  perspective.  We  test the 
evolution of risk sharing, based on the output sensitivity of consumption in EM (“consumption 
betas”, where both output and consumption are computed relative to the world´s) and find no 
improvement nor link with conventional FG-to-GDP ratios. We argued that this negative result 
can  be  attributed  to  two  main  factors.  First,  FG-to-GDP  ratios  overstate  the  increase  in 
international  portfolio  diversification  by  EM  residents.  A  revised  measure  of  diversification, 
which  displays  the  expected  positive  correlation  with  consumption  betas,  reveals  that 
diversification in EM is well below that in advanced economies, and has not improved in recent 
years.  Second,  the  rising  “financial  recoupling”  in  international  securities  markets  has 
significantly reduced the diversification gains.  
 
Finally, we explore the link between FG and financial stability from two angles. First, we 
examine whether FG played a role in determining the size of the growth response to with the 
2008-2009 global crisis, and find that, while at first sight FG appears weakly and positively 
related to growth collapses, the effect is largely capturing the negative incidence of external debt 
in times of global deleveraging. Secondly, we discuss the connection between FG and financial 
dollarization (a typical source of financial fragility in EM) and show that most of the recent 
decline  in  deposit  and  debt  dollarization  is  explained  by  valuation  effects  due  to  the  real 
appreciation  in  the  2000s,  as  well  as  gradual  on-shoring  of  residents´  savings  abroad  that 
supported  the  development  of  domestic  markets  at  the  expense  of  external,  hard-currency 
denominated  ones.  While  FG  may  have  favored  this  development,  the  correlation  between 
standard measures of FG and financial dollarization is not clear. 
 
In  sum,  our  exploration  indicates  that  FG  have  been  overstated  due  to  measurement 
choices, and that, beyond a benign effect on financial development, its incidence on financial 
risk sharing and contagion,  or its  role in  the recent  de-dollarization process  has  been rather 
muted.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section looks at alternative measures of FG, 
how  they  evolved  over  the  recent  period,  for  a  group  of  advanced,  emerging  and  frontier 
markets, in terms of intensity, direction and composition. The third section tackles the link of FG 
with  financial  development  (understood  as  local  market  deepening),  consumption  smoothing 
(through  international  portfolio  risk  sharing),  financial  stability,  and  systemic  currency 
mismatches. The last section summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
2.  What do we talk about when we talk about financial globalization? 
 
How to measure financial globalization? Despite being the subject of a rich and growing 
literature, FG, broadly understood as global linkages through cross-border financial flows, has 
been empirically approached in various, often uncorrelated ways in the academic work. As a result,  assessing  a  country’s  integration  with  international  financial  markets  remains  a 
complicated and controversial task.  Indeed, there is a general consensus about the need to at 
least distinguish between de jure and de facto financial globalization. While the former is based 
on regulations, restrictions and controls over capital flows and asset ownership, the latter is related 
to the intensity of capital flows and cross-market correlation and arbitrage. 
 
A succinct list of proxies for de jure globalization would include several measures typically 
based on the IMF´s AREAR (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1998, Quinn and Inclan 1997, Schindler, 
2009, Chinn and Ito, 2008: henceforth CI) or the IFC´s equity globalization index that measures the 
ratio of equity market capitalization that is investable for non-residents (Bekaert and Harvey, 1998). 
While all of these measures are predictably close to each other when applied to a particular financial 
market  (e.g.,  equities),  they  differ  across  markets  in  a  way  that  would  complicate  the 
characterization of a financially globalized economy.
3 Here, we consider as our  de jure measure 
CI’s index of financial openness.
4 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the extent to which globalization affects asset prices and, more 
generally, economic performance is related to the actual intensity and sensitivity o f the cross-
border flows, namely, de facto globalization, regardless of existing controls and restrictions. For 
example, many tightly regulated economies are the recipients and sources of important capital 
flows  (and  are  therefore  financially  globalized),  whereas  other  control -free  economies  are 
shunned by international investors and, as a result, are isolated from global market swings and 
trends. This distinction has led most researchers to focus on  de fact measures of FG, typically 
proxied by the ratio of foreign assets plus foreign liabilities over GDP, based on data on foreign 
positions compiled by Lane and Milessi Ferreti (2007; henceforth, LMF) –a measure that has 
become standard in the recent FG literature.
5 
 
Findings are not independent from how the sample is cut. In this paper, we focus on a set of 
34 emerging markets (EM), which we occasionally split into Asian, Latin America and other EM 
to analyse regional differences. In addition, for the sake of comparison, we divide developed 
economies into two groups: a set of 5 peripheral core economies (PCE: Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Norway and Sweden) that, in our view, provide a reasonable mirror in which to look at 
the relative developments in EM, and a sample of more advanced economies (G5: France, 
Germany,  Italy, Japan and the US) .
6 For a better comparison with existing r esults in the 
literature, in some cases we use a broader advanced markets category (AM), as well as a frontier 
                                                           
3 For instance, one country may choose to restrict access to stocks but let the fixed income markets (debt, currency 
derivatives) relatively untouched, leading to very different FG scores depending on the de jure measure of choice.  
4 The measure  is based on principal components extracted from disaggregated (qualitative) measures of capital and 
current account restrictions in the IMF’s AREAER, converted to numerical values by the authors. 
5Kraay, Loayza and Ventura (2005) report a similar dataset on country´s asset positions. An alternative approach to 
FG relies on price convergence, an application of the Law of one Price to financial markets. Measures within this 
group point at transaction costs and regulation that inhibit market arbitrage, and usually compare prices of identical 
or similar assets trading in different markets. On this, see  Levy Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen  (2009) and 
references therein.  
6 EM comprise countries customarily included in  emerging markets  indexes such as the MSCI o r  the EMBI, 
excluding financial centers (Singapore and Hong Kong) which tend to display disproportionate large gross cross -
border positions. The G5 comprises countries in the G7 group minus Canada (already included in PCE) and the UK 
(because of its  status as financial center). FM are less financially developed markets that do not make it to the 
emerging category. See the Appendix for a detailed list. markets  category  (FM)  that  comprises  less  financially  developed  economies  that  tend  to  be 
associated with limited financial integration. 
 
To have a first look at both the differences between each other and the evolution of each 
proxy over time, in Figure 1 we compare the standard de facto measure based on cross-border 
holdings compiled by LMF, showing the break down into equity, debt and FDI, all normalized 
by the country´s GDP. We also include CI ´s measure of de jure FG. 
 
As can be seen, the correlation between de jure and de facto measures of FG is far from 
perfect. They move hand in hand for EM, but de jure FG looks stable in more advanced countries 
(PCE and AE), despite the upward trend in de facto FG. Moreover, despite a relatively limited 
(and declining) de jure FG in Asian markets, the pattern of de facto FG looks similar to other 
EM, both cross section and over time. 
 
Also, the figure clearly shows that, for all the debate about growing financial integration in 
the emerging world, FG in EM is much smaller, and has been growing more slowly that in more 
advanced markets. 
 
Finally,  the  charts  document  a  difference  in  the  composition  of  the  FG-to-GDP  pattern 
between emerging and advanced economies. In the former, FG is driven by the increasing role of 
FDI and, more recently, equity markets as the main vehicles for cross-border investments, at the 
expense  of  debt  liabilities  (particularly  for  the  Latin  American  region),  a  fact  already 
documented in the literature.
7 In the latter, FG is still largely dominated by debt securities. 
 
This is more clearly seen when we compare  changes in gross foreign positions for the three 
different  instruments  (equity,  debt  and  FDI)  over  the  2000 -2007  period,  again  using  the 
traditional FG over GDP measure (Figure 2). The comparison highlights the marked decline in 
the debt liability position due to the rapid sovereign deleveraging process in EM (coupled with 
growing reserve assets, and a growing equity and FDI net liability position) and the contrast with 
the growing net debt of G5 countries. 
 
Generally,  Figures  1  and  2  indicate  a  growing  FG-to-GDP  pattern  across  the  board. 
However, this simple ratio downplays a number of potentially crucial measurement issues that 
may bias the empirical diagnosis and lead to erroneous policy implications, and that therefore 




                                                           
7 See, e.g., Cowan et al. (2006), Borensztein et al., (2007). Note that this debt pattern is not so much the results of 
declining debt ratios but rather a consequence of a greater reliance on domestic markets at the expense of external 
debt which was typically held by international investors. That said, to the extent that capital flight from EM 
allocated to emerging bond funds domiciled abroad are recorded as foreign holdings, the pattern may be reflecting a 
methodological bias associated with capital repatriation in the 2000s.   I.  Is the GDP the correct denominator for the FG ratio? 
 
Rather than the standard normalization by the (US dollar) GDP, normalization by the local 
market capitalization (marcap) seems to be more adequate when assessing cross-border flows as 
a  source  of  international  contagion  and  exogenous  price  volatility  –the  logic  being  that  the 
impact of cross border flows, presumably associated with foreign asset and liability holdings, 
will likely be a function of their size relative to the local market. Indeed, it can be shown that an 
increasing FG over GDP ratio, rather than a sign of growing globalization as it is typically 
interpreted, this  increase in  marcap  can be largely  explained as  the combination of a stable 
foreign  participation  and  a  deepening  local  market  –itself  a  reflection  of  equity  valuation 
changes. 
 
Table 1 and Figure 3 offer an alternative cut of FG data for the 2000s, looking at foreign 
equity and debt liabilities normalized by the host market capitalization (marcap), to zoom in on 
the question about whether a growing FG (over GDP) is a sign (and, possibly, a consequence) of 
greater  foreign  participation,  or  whether  it  just  reflects  (and  responds  to)  the  autonomous 
deepening of domestic markets, including through persistent price rallies. The re-normalization 
shows that the deepening of domestic markets played a central role in explaining the increase in 
the FG over GDP ratio, particularly in Latin American EM where the difference is more striking: 
FG  to  marcap  ratios  during  the  latest  period  remained  virtually  unchanged  for  equity  and 
contracted by 7% for debt securities. 
 
This evidence suggests that changes in FG to GDP ratios mask valuation effects due to asset 
inflation. Specifically, if the perceived rise in FG in EM equity markets is in part due to an 
increase in local market capitalization in terms of the GDP, much of equity market “deepening” 
was mechanically driven by the equity price increases prior to the 2008 crisis, rather than to new 
issuance. If so, the narrative of the evolution of FG based on GDP ratios would spuriously reflect 
equity markets booms and busts –another reason to use marcap ratios instead.
8 
 
Moreover, while  the standard normalization by the (US dollar) GDP looks  in principle 
natural for issues related with the country´s wealth diversification away from domestic shocks 
(and exposure to external shocks), in practice the GDP ratio ignores residents´ participation in 
local markets, and may ultimately suffer from the aforementioned valuation bias.
9 For example, a 
synchronized global equity price rally would automatically increase foreign and domestic equity 
holdings over GDP ratios, showing an increase in FG assets and liabilities over GDP regardless 
of the direction of the flows, indicating an inc rease in portfolio diversification even if the 
composition of equity portfolios remain the same.  
 
                                                           
8Similarly, to the extent that FDI cross-border asset holdings are constructed from FDI flows, distributed according 
to trade patterns (in line with the tight empirical correlation between trade and FDI flows) and adjusted for valuation 
using real bilateral exchange rates, one could argue that changes in the net FDI position should reflect the significant 
real appreciation of EM currencies, as well as the steady FDI net inflows. 
9 Note that, since debt holdings, unlike equity holdings, are computed at nominal rather than market values, price  
changes should not play a role, However, nominal values introduce a different bias: market  discounts (typically 
substantial in EM debt) that modify the foreign-domestic composition of residents´ portfolios, are not captured in the 
data, and may lead to an overstatement of the portfolio share allocated to local debt instruments. While the domestic-foreign composition or physical assets is hard to estimate (due to the lack 
of  reliable  capital  stock  data  for  most  developing  countries),  we  can  proxy  portfolio 
diversification  (PD)  as  the  foreign  share  of  the  representative  resident´s  equity  and  debt 
securities portfolio by combining LMF and marcap figures, such that: 
 
                                  
                                                           
                       
 
whereFEA and FEL (FDA and FDL) are foreign equity (debt) assets and liabilities.  
 
This  new measure has  the advantage of tracking the evolution  of the  resident  investor´s 
portfolio diversification while filtering out time trends such as equity price cycles.  
 
Figures  4  sheds  light  on  the  first  aspect:  note  the  stark  contrast  between  emerging  and 
advance economies. The level of PD in the developed world appears to be growing, although 
they are still too low to have a decisive impact in risk sharing. By contrast, PD in the emerging 
world is not only much lower (less than 10% for the representative resident´s portfolio) but has 
been falling over time (perhaps the reflection of local market development and the undoing of 
offshoring of domestic savings).
10 At any rate, the international portfolio diversification of EM 
residents appears to be quite limited and declining over time –a critical aspect that we will come 
back to when we look at FG and risk sharing below. 
 
II.  Are holdings a good indication of the intensity and nature of flows? 
 
The stock size of cross border holdings, while possibly a good indication of geographical 
diversification and international risk sharing, may not be the best summary statistic of de facto 
FG in the traditional sense of capital mobility and international arbitrage, since important gross 
flows in and out of a country over a given year are perfectly consistent with a relatively small net 
–as well as with small cumulative flows over longer periods. As a result, to the extent that 
foreign asset holdings largely reflect cumulative flows, intense flows could be consistent with a 
limited geographical diversification of assets and liabilities. Conversely, the existence of large 
foreign asset holdings (for example, as a result of capital flight) does not necessarily imply 
frequent rebalancing and cross-market arbitrage.  
 
How correlated are FG holdings and flows? In particular, are larger stocks of foreign 
assets and liabilities associated with larger flows of capital in and out of the country? The answer 
is yes, to varying degrees depending on the country group, and the type of instrument.  
 
To illustrate, we run regressions of the size (the absolute value) of annual Balance of 
Payments (BoP) flows on LMF´s beginning-of-the-period holdings –controlling for time effects 
to eliminate the spurious correlation associated with time-varying common factors such as price 
trends.  The  results,  which  we  report  separately  for  each  asset  and  country  group  in  Figure 
                                                           
10 On  the  prevalence  of  financial  offshoring  in  emerging  countries,  see  Levy  Yeyati  (2007).  Naturally,  the 
methodological bias mentioned in footnote 7 also applies here, to the extent that part of the offshored savings were 
invested in emerging markets vehicles domiciled abroad. 5,indicate that larger holdings are associated with larger flows, particularly in the case of FDI. 
However,  a  look  at  the  scatter  plots  of  the  partial  regression  residuals  shows  important 
differences when it comes to portfolio holdings, where the link with flows appear to be strong 
only for EM equity.  
 
The diverse nature of the correlation between stocks, on the one hand, and gross and net 
flows on the other is even more clear in the regressions of Table 2, where we run a minimalist 
panel specification of flows (total, and by asset type) on beginning-of-the-period holdings, plus 
additional controls. With the exception of debt securities, cross-border holding have a positive 
correlation with the associated flow. 
 
III.  Are all holders alike? 
 
The investor behind a particular flow may also be relevant to understand the nature and 
implications of FG. For example, a passive buy and hold portfolio investor may behave closer to 
real investors (FDI), with limited turnover (flows) for a given holding. By contrast, institutional 
or professional investors would tend to be more sensitive to expected return differentials, with 
both a larger turnover and a bigger impact in terms of price action its correlation across markets 
and with respect to economic fundamentals. Global mutual funds are a case in point in this 
regard. While, as a subset of cross-border holdings, they are generally a poorer proxy than other 
more  comprehensive  measures,  they  may  shed  some  additional  light  on  the  role  of  the 
international investor as a financial transmission channel. To the extent that these funds tend to 
keep  close  to  their  benchmarks,  they  may  introduce  an  additional  source  of  market  co-
movement, particularly in the event of sharp swings in global risk aversion (when contributions 
and redemptions lead to purchases and sales in all markets at the same time).
11As can be seen, 
global funds’ assets under management (AUM) and flows display a tight correlation once time 
trends are filtered out (Figure 5c). Moreover, initial AUM exhibits a strong explanatory power 
for its current flows (stronger than LMF measures for BoP flows), as shown in columns 7to 10 of 
Table 2.  
 
IV.  Financial globalization at a glance: Preliminary score 
 
From the previous discussion, it follows that the characterization of FG is complex and 
prone to potentially misleading simplifications, and cannot be summarized by the standard de 
facto measures. Because of that, the cross-country evolution of FG and its implications is best 
characterized by comparing and discussing alternative FG proxies. Specifically, in this paper we 
look at four different sources: (i) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2007) yearly dataset of cross border 
asset and liability holdings (by country, based on adjusted Balance of Payments data); (ii) the US 
Treasury’s TIC monthly survey data on the market value of sales and purchases,  and stock 
holdings of foreign securities by US-domiciled investors (by the market where the security is 
issued);  (iii)  capital  flows  from  the  IMF’s  Balance  of  Payments  Statistics;  and  (iv)  EPFR’s 
monthly data on global fund flows and assets under management (AUM) (by issuing country). 
                                                           
11 Anecdotal evidence suggests that herd behavior may also be present, albeit for different reasons, in the hedge fund 
industry, where the trades of a few leader funds may be emulated by others, stretching speculative positions and 
potentially amplifying the reversals. However, data on country-specific holdings and flows by hedge funds are not 
available to corroborate this hypothesis.   In short, the first pass at the data provides a few preliminary findings: 
 
  There is much less FG in EM than is usually thought. More precisely, FG-to-GDP 
ratios  in  EM  lag  those  in  advanced  economies.  Moreover,  when  normalized  by  the 
(growing) size of domestic markets, FG both in EM and advance countries have remained 
relatively stable in the past ten years. Thus, one can conclude that FG in both cases has 
largely mirrored the relative dynamism of local markets. On the one hand, the larger FG 
to GDP ratio in advanced economies simply reflects their deeper markets. On the other, 
the upward trend in equity FG to GDP ratios in EM masks valuation effects due to local 
asset inflation (in particular, the equity boom prior to the 2008 crisis). 
  FG in EM is still dominated by FDI, unlike in advance economies where debt securities 
still account for the larger part of cross border holdings –although equity flows have been 
gradually  taking  over  debt  flows  as  their  main  portfolio  vehicle,  especially  in  Latin 
America where debt liabilities declined markedly due to sovereign deleveraging. 
  Portfolio diversification in EM is still very limited, and has been declining over time. 
Indeed, there seems to be no correlation between traditional measures of FG and the 
degree to which EM residents diversify into international securities. 
  There is a significant correlation between liability holdings and the corresponding 
flows,  particularly  for  FDI  and  equity  instruments,  which  suggests  that,  while  not 
interchangeable, larger stocks lead to larger flows –a link relevant to the discussion of FG 
and financial stability below. 
  There is little (if any) correlation between de jure and de facto measures. While this 
does not come as a surprise, it warns us that they represent different economic aspects 
and, at the very least, they should not be used interchangeably. It also motivates our focus 
on de facto FG in the rest of the paper.  
 
3.  Why do we care about financial globalization?  
 
Conventional  wisdom  tells  us  that  FG,  by  attracting  sophisticated  investors  and 
considerable liquidity, should foster the development of domestic financial markets.
12 However, 
on the other hand, deeper, more liquid markets are expected to attract foreign inflows and larger 
sophisticated investors that require a minimum trading scale.  
 
Indeed, as we have shown above, while FG GDP ratios have been on the rise for most 
EM, FG marcap ratios have remained relatively stable. Are the former (the key exhibit behind 
the conventional view of the ever rising FG in the emerging world) simply the reflection of 
international  investors  catching  up,  belatedly,  with  local  market  develop ments?  Moreover, 
intuitively, tighter financial integration could foster the transmission of shocks in financial 
centers  to  peripheral  advanced  and  developing  markets,  creating  an  exogenous  source  of 
financial (and ultimately real) instability. In what follows we revisit the causes and consequences 
of FG from an empirical perspective. 
 
                                                           
12 See, e.g., Mishkin (2007) and Kose et al. (2010). I.  Does FG foster financial depth? 
 
The  drivers  of  financial  globalization  have  not  received  much  attention  despite  the 
increase in financial integration in the last two decades. Many studies acknowledge the link 
between trade and financial openness in the one hand, and financial integration with domestic 
financial  development  on  the  other,  illustrated  in  a  simple  way  in  Figure  6.  However,  the 
literature leaves some key questions unanswered regarding this link. Does the composition of 
financial integration matter? Is the link instrument-specific (that is, does a deep domestic equity 
market leads to more FG in the equity market, as opposed to FG in general)? How do these links 
vary across different group of countries? Finally and perhaps more importantly: Does financial 
development causes financial globalization or the other way around?  
 
One can think of a number of portfolio considerations that intervene in the degree and 
intensity  of  cross-market  investment.  For  starters,  investors  tend  to  maximize  risk-adjusted 
returns across different markets, balancing yield equalization and diversification and risk pooling 
(the more so, the les correlated national markets are). But there are a number of aspects (which 
can be broadly grouped as transaction costs) that are not included in the asset price quote but 
may end up being more relevant than attractive yields or hedging benefits. This aspects include 
not  only  financial  innovation  that  reduces  transfer  and  settlement  costs,  and  facilitates 
monitoring and transparency, but also access to specialized analysis (which in turn requires a 
minimum market size to justify specialization costs), and a rich menu of instruments to cater 
specific investors, both of which require a minimum market size to justify specialization and 
standardization costs. Market size is also critical in terms of liquidity risks, which may keep big 
players away. 
 
Thus, even in the face of a decline in credit risks (due, e.g., to enhanced fiscal solvency) 
currency risk (due, e.g., to a balanced of long currency position and a reduced tail risk of a sharp 
currency run), local markets may fail to fully develop scale until…they gain a minimum scale. 
This rather circular logic highlights the simultaneity problem noted above: If, a priori, market 
depth is a condition for foreign participation and foreign participation fosters market deepening, 
how can we tell one link from the other?  
 
To shed light on the complex –and possibly bi-directional –connection between financial 
development and FG, we first build on work by Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2008) on the drivers 
of FG, which reports a positive cross-country correlation between their measure of FG (foreign 
asset + foreign liabilities over GDP) and financial development (proxied by bank deposits and 
stock market  capitalization to  GDP), for a sample of EM and advanced markets  (AM). We 
extend  their  exercise  to  the  period  1995-2007  (the  latest  year  for  which  LMF  is  available), 
include FM in the sample, and run panel regressions for FG as a whole and broken down into 
equity, debt and FDI, In addition, we include time dummies to capture common factors such as global liquidity and risk aversion, and fund reallocations relative to core markets,
13 and GDP per 
capita, as a broad proxy for economic (and domestic financial) development.
14 
 
Last, but not least, the way in which FG is measured is not irrelevant: an improvement of 
local market conditions should be correlated with an increase in gross (and net) foreign liabilities 
(locals bringing money back; foreigners bringing money in), rather than the standard FG measure 
used  in  the  original  paper.  While  the  literature  that  looks  at  the  globalization-financial 
development link often treats foreign assets and liabilities similarly (as in the standard LMF´s FG 
measure), there is in principle no reason why capital outflows should be positively related with 
local market development. By the same token, a deep equity market should attract equity flows 
but not necessarily other unrelated flows. As expected, there connection between the depth of the 
local market and foreign investment is stronger when we focus on a single market (as we do for 
equities in Figure 7). 
 
The regression results, reported in Table 3for a sample of EM equity markets, show a 
closer link between local stock market development and foreign equity liabilities (as opposed to 
the  sum  of  assets  and  liabilities  used  in  the  original  paper).
15The  link  between  financial 
development and  FG  is weaker for  cross-country  and stronger over time, where  financial 
development is proxied by the sum of equity market capitalization and bank deposits over GDP 
as in the original specification (columns 1 and 2).  We split our financial development proxy 
considering bank deposits and equity market capitalization as different variables instead of their 
sum. Columns 3 and 4 show that FG (as the sum of total fore ign assets and liabilities) has a 
stronger link with bank deposits than with stock market capitalization. Furthermore, columns 5 
and 6 confirm our hypothesis that financial domestic markets that a deep domestic equity market 
is strongly linked to more FG in the equity market, as opposed to FG in general. 
 
As  noted,  the  strong  link  between  financial  globalization   and  financial  domestic 
development comes with a severe endogeneity problem: foreign flows to equity and local debt 
markets, by definition, add to these markets´ liquidity and depth. Is it the domestic market depth 
that draws foreign inflows, or rather the  latter that fosters the deepening of domestic  markets? 
The connection from FG to domestic financial markets have been noted by Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), who emphasize the impact of FG and trade liberalization on the size of the domestic 
financial sector. In the same direction, Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2008)  estimate dynamic 
GMM with internal instruments to argue that both FG and trade openness cause greater financial 
development (measured separately as private credit, and local stock market capitalization). 
 
This  causality  problem  is  best  approached  by  looking  at  foreign  liabilities  and  the 
domestic depth of the equity market.
16In line with Baltagi, Demetriades and Law (2008), we 
                                                           
13 See the Appendix for a detailed list. AM are the 28 advanced countries used in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). 
All variables are lagged and included in logs, except capital account openness. 
14 As LMF note in their paper, “the level of economic development can also be an important factor in explaining 
domestic residents’ propensity to engage in cross-border asset trade.” We prefer to include it here more specifically 
as an indicator that subsumes many of the transaction costs listed above. 
15 Note that the correlation between de jure and de facto FG is generally not significant or of the opposite sign, in 
line with the findings in the previous section. 
16 Cross-border holdings and flows could influence the depth of the banking sector, albeit in a less straightforward 
way, to the extent that flows are largely intermediated by banks. estimate a GMM, albeit with a few changes. We focus on the more homogeneous EM group, and 
compute,  for  each  country-year,  equity  FG  averages  excluding  its  own  ratio,  as  an  external 
instrument –the assumption being that FG, which is highly correlated across EM (the median 
correlation between individual Equity Liability holdings and their EM group aggregates is 0.86) 
can  only  affect  financial  development  in  the  host  country.
17 The results indicate that  equity 
inflows indeed appear to foster the deepening of the equity market (columns 7 and 8 of Table 3).  
What can we conclude from this preliminary evidence? While foreign capital does seem to flow 
to larger, deeper markets, there is at least some indicative evidence that it also has contributed to 
develop the corresponding local market. For example, growing foreign holdings of EM equity 
(rather than broader measures of FG) led to growing EM equity markets. Ultimately, in this 
regard,  foreign  capital  is  no  different  than  the  domestic  one,  both  attracted  and  attracting 
liquidity to the market place. 
 
II.  FG and international risk sharing 
 
In  past  theoretical  research  studies,  the  implications  about  financial  integration  and 
macroeconomic  volatility  are  clear:  countries  with  greater  FG  should  reduce  consumption 
relative to output volatility through international risk sharing. 
 
In theory, one of the more important benefits of financial globalization comes by allowing 
more  efficient  international  risk  sharing  in  a  country.  As  is  stated  in  the  literature,  a  more 
efficient international risk sharing may help reduce consumption volatility. Standard theoretical 
open economy models yield clear testable implications regarding the role of financial integration 
in  risk  sharing:  the  farther  the  country  is  from  financial  autarky,  the  lower  the  correlation 
between consumption and domestic output, and the greater the correlation of consumption across 
(financially  integrated)  countries.  Furthermore,  models  with  complete  markets  predict  that 
correlation of consumption growth  with  the growth of world  output (or, equivalently, world 
consumption) would be higher than that with domestic output.  
 
Recent empirical studies have failed to validate this premise. Kose et  al. (2007) analyze 
output and consumption growth rates, and their volatilities, for the period 1960-2004, and finds 
little evidence on a beneficial effect from FG on international risk sharing (as captured by a 
smoothing out of output changes in the consumption pattern, once common global shocks are 
filtered out). In particular, following a standard risk sharing measure, they measure risk sharing 
as the consumption betas estimated from:  
 
                                                                             (1) 
 
where         is the PPP-measured per capita consumption (GDP),    (   ) is the world per capita 
consumption (GDP).
18   and   are, respectively, measures of aggregate (common) movements in 
consumption  and  output.  Since  it  is  not  possible  to  share  the  risk  associated  with  common 
                                                           
17We run a parsimonious version of the previous specification, dropping trade and other financial development 
proxies that are generally not significant, to gain observations at a minimum loss of information. 
18 Growth in World Output and Consumption is measured as followed:  , where   is either 
real per capita consumption or output in country i (where the country belongs to the AM sub-sample), and 
is the share country i represents of AM consumption or GDP measured by PPP current prices. fluctuations,  the  common  component  of  each  variable  is  subtracted  from  the  corresponding 
national variable. The difference between the national and common world component of each 
variable  captures  the  idiosyncratic  (country-specific)  fluctuations  in  that  variable.  In  this 
specification, under complete markets and perfect international risk sharing, the left-hand side of 
the equation should be zero.  
 
In turn, to assess the influence of FG on international risk, they estimate, 
 
                       
 
                                                                      (2) 
 
where FGi is a measure of the country´s financial globalization over the period, and the degree of 
risk  sharing  is  measured  by              ,    where  a  negative   would  indicate  higher  risk 
sharing  for  higher  FG.  The  study  focuses  on  three  measures  of  financial  integration:  gross 
holdings (the sum of foreign assets and liability holdings), assets holdings, and liability holdings, 
and finds that FG improves risk sharing only for the late period (1987-2004), the one most 
closely associated with an advance in FG, and for advanced economies.
19 
 
The data does not support these premises.  The figures shown in  Table 4 indicate that 
consumption volatility generally exceeds that of output. Moreover, the same figures suggest that, 
for MFI, the volatility of consumption growth relative to that of output have increased in the last 
decades, while it has decreased for LFI. 
 
A first glance at the data indicates that this pattern has continued to prevail. Table 4 
presents  descriptive  statistics  of  growth  and  consumption  volatility  for  1995-2007  (and  the 
subperiod 2000-2007), across our selected country groups. The statistics indicate that, in recent 
years, output volatility and economic growth seem to have moved hand in hand. EM exhibits the 
highest output volatility, AM the lowest, and frontier markets (FM) lie in between.  
 
Overall, the ratio of consumption over growth volatility ranks according to priors: the 
lower  for  presumably  more  financially  integrated  AM,  followed  by  EM  and  FM.  However, 
when, following Prassad et al. (2003), we divide the developing group (EM+FM) into More 
Financially Integrated (MFI) and Less Financially Integrated (LFI) economies (whether FG over 
GDP lies above or below the sample median), the link is much less clear: in contrast with LFI 
economies, MFI do not appear to have benefited from smoother consumption volatility –despite 
the marked decline in growth volatility.
20 
   
Figure 8 offers another glance at the same evidence. Following Bai and Zhang (2005), it 
asks whether the country-specific sensitivity of consumption to output growth (relative to global 
values, estimated based on annual data), increased in the 2000s relative to the 90s, as FG-to-GDP 
ratios rose. Sensitivities appear to have remained stubbornly close to one to one in the past two 
decades, contradicting the risk sharing argument. 
 
                                                           
19These results expand on previous findings by Kose et al. (2007) along the same lines, for the period 1960-1995. 
20 FG is measured here, as usual, as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP. In order to measure the impact of FG on risk sharing more rigorously, we proceed in two 
steps. We first estimate, for the period 1995-2007, “consumption betas” country by country using 
(1). Next, we run a regression of estimated betas on alternative measures of FG.
21The standard 
FG proxy appears negatively correlated with betas for the AM sample (Figure 9), but the link is 
not significant (and changes sign) for EM. 
22 
 
Why this disappointing result?  Kose et al. (2010) address and discard a number of 
potential explanations (measurement errors, country characteristics, FG composition), to propose 
two hypothesis: (i) a threshold effect, namely, the idea that countries need to achieve a minimum 
degree of integration to reap the diversification benefits (a proposition prompted by the better 
results they find for AM), and (ii) the pro-cyclicality of capital flows in emerging markets, which 
in principle may offset the risk sharing benefits of FG.  
 
While the first hypothesis is virtually impossible to verify, a casual look at the data 
suggests  that  a  simple  threshold  cannot  explain  the  whole  story.  The  fact  that  emerging 
economies exhibit today levels of FG comparable to those exhibited by AM  in the past begs the 
following question: Do developing countries with AM -level FG display a better risk sharing 
pattern? Figure 10 shows consumption and GDP growth pairs within the developing group for 
the period 1995-2007, broken into high and low FG, according to whether or not the level of FG 
of a given pair lies within the AM range for the same period. As can be seen, the results, if 
anything, contradict the hypothesis: high FG pairs display higher consumption betas. 
 
The  second  hypothesis  is  also  hard  to  substantiate  in  the  data.  For  starters,  the 
diversification benefits of FG as measured in the literature (namely, in terms of international 
portfolio diversification) should in principle work through a decoupling of residents´ income 
from the domestic economic cycle. By borrowing and investing abroad, residents benefit from 
income from their foreign assets that is uncorrelated with the domestic cycle, while sharing the 
ups  and  downs  of  the  domestic  cycle  with  foreign  lenders.  In  this  light,  capital  flows  pro-
cyclicality should a priori have little to do with risk sharing and consumption smoothing: indeed, 
to the extent that capital flows have a stronger impact on GDP growth than on the consumption 
pattern, they should increase “measured” risk sharing. Moreover, as Kose and coauthors suggest, 
the recent shift away from pro-cyclical fixed income securities (most notably, bonded debt) to 
variable  income  vehicles  (FDI  and  equity  flows)  should  have  mitigated  capital  flow  pro-
cyclicality in the recent period, which is at odds with the persistently high consumption betas 
found in recent data (Figure 9). 
   
Here, we highlight two alternative reasons that, we believe, may explain why higher FG 
does  not  lead  to  a  smoother  consumption  pattern.  The  first  one  is  related  to  measurement 
considerations. If consumption smoothing is the result of a diversified portfolio, the standard FG 
measure may not be the best gauge. The previous discussion of the price effect in equity markets 
is a good illustration of the limits of FG over GDP as a proxy for portfolio diversification: as 
equity prices rise, the share of foreign equity over GDP also rises, regardless of whether the 
foreign share of the residents´ equity portfolio changes. Thus, we may be looking at increased 
                                                           
21 Note that this is similar to allowing  to vary across countries in Kose et al.´s panel estimation –and that their risk 
sharing measure for country i would equal to 1-bi..  
22Using FDI holdings, or the sum of equity plus debt holdings, over GDP as FG proxies yields comparable results. diversification when there is none. More generally, by looking only at the standard FG proxy, we 
miss domestic assets that typically represent the largest part of residents´ wealth.  
   
Does our new measure of portfolio diversification (PD) fix the problem? Reassuringly, 
when in Figure 10 we substitute PD for the standard FG-to-GDP measure, we indeed obtain a 
better fit and a negative slope for EM. Thus, while the use of PD brings the analysis conceptually 
closer to a risk sharing test and the data empirically closer to the expected negative correlation 
between globalization and risk sharing, results are still far from the theoretical result. This should 
not be surprising given the rather low degree of diversification in the developing world (Figure 
4). Moreover, the menu of financial assets in middle- to low-income countries is often limited 
and accessible only to a small population of high-income households. 
 
What if financial assets were made available to the middle class with savings capacity, 
the one often associated with more advanced economies? And why is risk sharing so limited in 
the developed world where financial sophistication and access should not be such a problem? 
 
An  additional  reason  why  the  global  diversification  of  financial  portfolios  does  not 
immediately translate into smoother (less cyclical) consumption pattern, independent of portfolio 
composition and financial access, lies in the fact that financial assets tend to move very close to 
each  other,  particularly  in  the  event  of  extreme  events.  In  other  words,  the  international 
diversification  margin  may  have  been  declining  along  with  a  steady  process  of  financial 
recoupling, namely, the growing co-movement between EM and global portfolio assets (Levy 
Yeyati, 2011).  
 
Figure 12 illustrates the point: the share of the variability of returns explained by the first 
principal component (PC1)is large and has been growing larger over time (even before the 2008-
2009 sell-off).
23In turn, PC1 is highly correlated with global  assets returns, as captured by the 
S&P 500 and MSCI equity indexes, and the spread on high yield US corporate debt  (Table 5), 
indicating that most of the co-movement displayed by EM assets comes from global influences 
or  globally  synchronized  shocks.  In  sum,  even  if  residents  in  emerging  economies  were  to 
diversify their portfolio internationally, the diversification gains would be limited by the growing 
co-movement with other EM or with AM, limiting in turn the impact of FG on their consumption 
pattern. 
 
III.  FG and global event risk: The test of the global financial crisis 
 
If  the  benefits  of  FG  in  terms  of  international  risk  sharing  and  output  and  consumption 
smoothing are, at best, elusive, what about the tail risks of a global systemic shock? Does FG 
amplify the adverse impact of generalized external shocks in a situation where, no risk sharing is 
available? Do external crisis propagate more when the domestic economy is financially linked 
with the crisis epicenter? 
 
                                                           
23 For the figure, we regress country-specific equity. FX and CDS spread changeson the PC1 constructed based on 
changes in the corresponding asset for all EM.Credit default swaps (CDS) spreads are used as a proxy for debt 
securities. Importantly, while the analysis in the figure is based on monthly returns, the co-movement also verifies 
(and often increases) for longer horizons. The global financial crisis of 2008 offers a perfect event to evaluate this question empirically. 
Empirical  views  on  the  subject  differ.  On  the  other  hand,  analysts  have  found  that  richer 
countries (as measured by their per capita GDP) have fared worse than poorer ones (Claessens et 
al., 2010; Frankel and Savarelos 2010, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010, Rose and Spiegel 2010). 
On the other, they found that middle-income economies suffered collapses comparable to those 
in high-income economies (Didier, Hevia and Schmukler, 2010). 
 
Did FG play a role in the impact of the crisis? To answer this question, a good starting point 
is provided by Didier, Hevia and Schmukler (2010), who analyze both the correlation between 
the  growth  collapse  and  the  subsequent  recovery  in  different  countries,  and  a  few  variables 
including  FG proxies, based  on a definition of  growth collapse as the  2009  – 2007  growth 
differential.  
 
We reproduce this exercise in Figure 13, where in addition we divide the sample into the 
three financial market categories used above: AM, EM, and FM. Interestingly, our EM sample 
(which differs significantly from the Middle Income one, in particular because of their higher 
degree  of  FG)  appears  to  have  done  slightly  worse  than  AM  in  terms  of  growth  collapse. 
Moreover, as Figure 14seems to confirm, both in EM and –particularly– in AM, the growth 
collapse seems to be have been negatively associated with FG (greater FG leading to sharper 
drops in the growth rate). 
 
The differential sensitivity to the global shock has been attributed to many factors other than 
FG, in particular, trade openness that may have been the main channel of contagion to the real 
economy. Moreover, even if the link between FG and growth collapse is robust to the inclusion 
of  trade,  it  may  well  be  capturing  other  variables,  such  as  external  debt,  that  can  be  more 
naturally linked with the economic response to a crisis tied to a global liquidity crunch.  
 
In Table 6, we build on Didier, Hevia and Schmukler´s (2010) cross section regressions of 
growth collapses on financial integration to investigate these points. Results are rather mixed –
not surprisingly, given the simultaneous, hard-to-identify effects of the many events surrounding 
the crisis period. The EM dummy appears negative (in line with Figure 13), and so does the 
standard FG proxy, but significance is poor. But it is the stock of foreign debt liabilities that 
explains the association with a harder collapse. While any conclusion from a test based on a 
cross section of observations corresponding to a period populated with so many simultaneous 
systemic shocks is bound to be taken with caution, it appears that FG played, if anything, a 
neutral role in the output response to the global crisis, beyond its correlation with hard-currency 
liquidity needs of liquidity-constrained, heavily indebted countries. 
 
 
 4.  Final remarks 
 
Perhaps the main take away from the previous empirical examination of FG is its most 
pedestrian  finding:  for  all  the  market  and  media  hype  about  the  increasing  globalization  of 
emerging economies, financial globalization in the emerging world appears to have been 
vastly  overstated. Rather than growing in the 1990s and 2000s as usually argued based on 
standard GDP ratios, de facto globalization have accompanied (and, to some extent, supported) a 
more secular process of financial deepening (in EM and elsewhere), temporarily slowed down by 
the recent global crisis. More precisely, once measured in a way that minimize the various biases 
that plagued the most popular empirical proxies, FG in EM looks rather stable, and well below 
advance country levels. 
 
This  finding  is  critical  for  an  FG  debate  that  often  investigates  its  causes  and 
consequences starting from the debatable premise that FG has actually strengthened over the 
years.  Instead,  the  globalization  process  during  the  1990s  (which  almost  defined  emerging 
markets as a concept) came to a halt in the 2000s.
24 
 
Importantly, FG levels may have been further overstated by measurement problems, since 
part of the offshored financial intermediation of developing country residents is often reported as 
foreign, both because of the domicile of the investment vehicles (e.g., global funds and ETFs) 
and because of tax evasion (which cause residents to misreport transactions booked in financial 
centers). 
 
That said, it is true that the ratio of foreign liabilities over GDP has been on the rise, and 
that  the  current  enthusiasm  for  EM  continues  to  elicit  overweight  portfolio  positions  from 
benchmarked investors, plus an increasingly active speculative turnover, all of which opens the 
question  of  whether  cross-border  holdings  –particularly,  easy-to-unwind  foreign  portfolio 
liabilities– are good or bad or, more generally, should be taken by policy makers as a source of 
concern. However, low and stable levels of FG, coupled with measurement limitations and the 
short time span of relevant FG data for EM, advises to take any normative conclusion with a 
grain of salt.  
                                                           
24This is particularly so for emerging Latin America, where FG lags those in their emerging peers, and have come 
down in the 2000s reflecting in part the sovereign de-leveraging trend in the region. References 
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Note: The figure shows country group averages of de facto FG over GDP and CI ´s measure of de jure FG. Only countries with complete data from 







































































































































































































































































Note: The figure shows country group averages of de facto FG over GDP and CI ´s measure of de jure FG. Only countries with complete data from 




















































































































































































































































































Note: The figure presents changes of de facto FG  over GDP. The country sample is the same as in F1a. Changes are from 1999 to 2007. Source: 
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Note: The figure presents changes of de facto FG  over GDP. The country sample is the same as in F1b. Changes are from 1999 to 2007. Source: 
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Others-EMFigure 3a. FG and different normalizations: EM vs. others 
 
 
Note: The figure presents changes in foreign equity/debt liabilities divided by GDP or the corresponding market capitalization. Changes are from 










































FDL/GDP FDL/DebtFigure 3b. FG and different normalizations: Within EM 
 
 
Note: The figure presents changes foreign equity and debt liabilities divided by GDP or the corresponding market capitalization. Changes are from 









































FDL/GDP FDL/DebtFigure 4. Portfolio Diversification 
 
Note: The figure shows level of portfolio diversification (PD) in 1999 and 2007. PD is measured as (FEA+FDA)/(NFEA+NFDA+Mcap+Total Debt). 
FEA is foreign equity assets, FDA is foreign debt assets, NFEA is net foreign equity assets and NFDA is net foreign debt assets. Source: LMF 






























1999 2007Figure 5a. Initial Holdings and Flows by different instruments: EM
 
Note: The figures shows partial regression plots from estimations of abs(flows) vs. end-of-last-period FG holdings for different instruments (equity, 
debt, FDI). Time dummies and de jure capital account openness were included in the regressions as additional controls. Source: LMF (2008), BoP 
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Figure 5b. Initial Holdings and Flows by different instruments: AM 
 
Note: The figure shows partial regression plots from estimations of abs(flows) vs. lagged FG holdings for different instruments (equity, debt, FDI). 
Time dummies and de jure capital account openness were included as additional controls in the regressions. Source: LMF (2008), BoP IMF IFS, 
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Figure 5c. Initial Holdings and flows: Global Funds 
 
Note: The figure shows partial regression plots from estimations of abs(flows) vs. lagged FG holdings. Time dummies and de jure capital account 





































-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Lagged Equity AUM































-.01 0 .01 .02 .03
Debt Liability Fund Flows
coef = .10601024, (robust) se = .0104411, t = 10.15
EM 
Figure 6. FG, trade and financial development: First glimpse 
 
Note: The figure plots  de facto FG (measured as is sum of stock of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP against trade openness (measured as 
exports plus imports over GDP).. The sample comprises EM countries with data available from 1995-2007 excluding Singapore. (***) denotes that 
the slope of the simple regression is significant at a 1% level. Source: WDI and LMF (2008). 
 
Note: The figure plots de facto FG (measured as is sum of stock of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP)  against domestic financial development 
(measured as the sum of bank deposits and equity marcap over GDP). The sample comprises EM countries with data available from 1995-2007 
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Figure 7. Domestic Financial Development and FG: Equity Markets 
 
Note: The figure plots foreign equity liabilities over GDP against equity market capitalization over GDP . (***) denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 8. Risk Sharing and FG 
 
Note: The figure plots per capita consumption against output growth. X_(i)-X_(World) refers to the domestic variable minus the world variable. C, 
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Figure 9. Risk Sharing: Consumption betas vs. FG 
 
Note: The figure presents a scatter plot of consumption betas as measured by the slope of c_(i)-c_(World) to y_(i)-y_(World) vs. FG/GDP. C and Y 
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Figure 10.The higher FG the greater risk sharing? 
 
Note: The figure plots consumption against per capita output growth in countries with high and low financial globalization. X_(i)-X_(World) refers 
to the domestic variable minus world variable. C, and Y represent consumption and per capita output growth.  The sample comprises all developing 
countries. High and low FG is determined by the lower bound of FG in advanced markets sample. If a country is above that lower bound, it belongs 
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Figure 11. Risk Sharing and Portfolio Diversification 
 
Note: The figure plot consumption betas (measured by the slope of c_(i)-c_(World) to y_(i)-y_(World)) against portfolio diversification (as measured 
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Figure 12. Financial recoupling in EM: Across Assets 
 
Note: The figure reports the average R-squared of the regressions of country-specific equity returns, FX returns and sovereign credit spreads on the 
corresponding first principal component computed over an emerging markets sample. Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
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Figure 13. Growth collapse in the global financial crisis 
 
Note: In the left half of the figure, growth collapse is measured as growth in 2009 minus growth in 2007. The income classification if from World 
Bank's July 2010 classification. In the right side of the figure, growth collapse is measured as growth in 2009 minus the average growth rate in the 
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Figure 14. Growth collapse and FG: The global financial crisis 
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Table 1. FG and different normalizations 
Variable  Year  Level  Difference 
      EM  PCE  G5  EM  PCE  G5 
FEL/GDP 
1999  10.2%  24.6%  20.3% 
9.7%  5.3%  6.3% 
2007  19.9%  29.8%  26.6% 
FEL/Mcap 
1999  18.5%  25.7%  22.1% 
2.9%  1.9%  8.7% 
2007  21.4%  27.7%  30.9% 
FDL/GDP 
1999  8.8%  39.7%  25.9% 
2.4%  13.1%  29.3% 
2007  11.2%  52.8%  55.2% 
FDL/Debt 
1999  23.7%  39.3%  21.2% 
-3.5%  6.5%  8.9% 
2007  20.2%  45.9%  30.0% 












 Table 2. Initial Holdings and Flows 
   FE  BE  FE  BE  FE  BE  FE  BE  FE  BE 




Funds  Debt Global Funds  Debt Global Funds 
EM Absolute Flows 
Stock of Foreign Equity 
Liab.  4.310***  10.95***                         
   (0.677)  (2.821)                         
Stock of Foreign Debt Liab.        1.863  3.322**                   
         (1.537)  (1.491)                   
Stock of Foreign FDI Liab.              20.96**  16.56***             
               (9.013)  (2.816)             
AUM Stock                    0.0405***  0.0655***  0.072***  0.115*** 
                     (0.0139)  (0.0123)  (0.0104)  (0.0096) 
Observations  383  383  398  398  433  433  168  168  88  88 
R-squared  0.174  0.736  0.045  0.349  0.417  0.666  0.541  0.614  0.6016  0.8828 
Countries  25  25  24  24  25  25  21  21  22  22 
AM Absolute Flows 
Stock of Foreign Equity 
Liab.  0.170  3.602***                         
   (2.161)  (0.708)                         
Stock of Foreign Debt Liab.        3.771***  5.399***                   
         (0.611)  (1.299)                   
Stock of Foreign FDI Liab.              13.24  7.903***             
               (11.75)  (2.171)             
Observations  274  274  280  280  298  298             
R-squared  0.168  0.996  0.306  0.742  0.238  0.954             
Countries  17  17  17  17  17  17             
Note: This table presents estimations of absolute flows vs. lagged stocks of different financial globalization variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. FE indicates fixed effects estimation, and BE 
indicates between estimation. FG stock variables are lagged one period. All estimations include time dummies and capital account openness as additional control. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Table 3. FG and domestic financial development 
Group of Countries  EM  EM  EM  EM  EM  EM  EM  EM 
Type of estimation  BE  FE  BE  FE  BE  FE  GMM (External)  GMM (Internal) 
VARIABLES  FG  FG  FG  FG  Equity Liabilities  Equity Liabilities  Equity Marcap  Equity Marcap 
Trade  0.195  0.186  0.324*  0.184  -0.241  -0.262       
   (0.140)  (0.132)  (0.159)  (0.124)  (0.405)  (0.544)       
Financial Development  0.138  0.375***                   
   (0.110)  (0.0720)                   
Equity Marcap/GDP (FD1)        0.159*  0.0878**  0.647**  0.493**       
         (0.0901)  (0.0403)  (0.229)  (0.215)       
Bank Deposits/GDP (FD2)        -0.186  0.430***  0.631  -0.642*       
         (0.189)  (0.120)  (0.480)  (0.364)       
Foreign Equity Liab/GDP                    0.402***  0.418*** 
                     (0.114)  (0.131) 
GDP per capita PPP  0.143  0.00144  0.144  -0.140  0.208  1.469*  0.405  0.535 
   (0.0993)  (0.211)  (0.0978)  (0.237)  (0.249)  (0.854)  (0.740)  (0.788) 
KA Openness  0.110*  -0.0128  0.0901  -0.0134  -0.0134  0.0939       
   (0.0620)  (0.0162)  (0.0610)  (0.0194)  (0.155)  (0.104)       
Constant  -2.582**  -2.430  -2.752**  -1.403  -7.368**  -14.95*       
   (1.136)  (1.937)  (1.127)  (2.148)  (2.871)  (7.276)       
P-value Joint Test        0.2357  0.001***  0.000***  0.025**       
Observations  326  326  326  326  326  326  323  323 
Countries  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27 
R-squared  0.550  0.581  0.588  0.584  0.742  0.536       
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. BE and FE indicate between and within estimates. All variables are in logs except capital account openness. All variables are lagged one 
period. Regressions include time dummies. Joint test is FD1=FD2=0. External instrument is rest-of-EM average FG.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Table 4. Output and Consumption volatility: Group Medians 
 Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample     Late Period  Late Period    
 Period  1995-2007  1995-2007     2000-2007  2000-2007    
Variable   Volatility Y  Volatility C  Ratio  Volatility Y  Volatility C   Ratio  
Full Sample 
2.0479  2.3151            
1.13   1.5727  1.8504            
1.18  
(1.7193)  (2.3557)     (1.5481)  (2.1965)    
AM 
1.1995  1.1041            
0.92   1.2349  0.9973            
0.81  
(0.4551)  (0.7680)     (0.3853)  (0.9085)    
EM 
3.2135  4.2959            
1.34   1.9481  2.3524            
1.21  
(1.7803)  (2.2195)     (2.0011)  (2.4793)    
FM 
2.1109  3.5319            
1.67   1.9681  3.1093            
1.58  
(1.2735)  (2.2865)     (0.5892)  (1.9335)    
MFI 
2.8847  4.6620            
1.62   1.6999  2.9576            
1.74  
(1.8151)  (2.4317)     (2.3729)  (2.7419)    
LFI  
2.2018  3.3633            
1.53   2.0503  2.1163            
1.03  
(1.6487)  (1.9825)     (0.8561)  (1.8566)    
Note: More financially integrated (MFI) economies are developing economies with FG (measured by the sum 
of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP) above the sample median. LFI are economies with FG below the 
sample median. Full sample is 1995-2007 and late period is 2000-2007. Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 












 Table 5. Correlations first PC vs. Global Indexes 
      S&P  MSCI 













  2000-2009  0.843  0.941  -0.685 
2000-2004  0.831  0.919  -0.616 












  2000-2009  0.810  0.892  -0.641 
2000-2004  0.786  0.817  -0.640 










2000-2009  -0.625  -0.671  0.753 
2000-2004  -0.526  -0.566  0.516 
2005-2009  -0.775  -0.774  0.815 
Note: This table reports the correlation of global indices vs. the first 

















 Table 6. Tail risk and FG: The global financial crisis 
Country Group  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries  EM  EM  EM 
VARIABLES  Growth Collapse  Growth Collapse  Growth Collapse  Growth Collapse  Growth Collapse  Growth Collapse 
                    
AM  -1.248  0.218  0.416          
   (1.131)  (1.563)  (1.545)          
EM  -3.004*  -2.998*  -2.872*          
   (1.568)  (1.552)  (1.508)          
Trade  -0.0443**  -0.0369*  -0.0363*  -0.0148  -0.00629  -0.0270 
   (0.0172)  (0.0189)  (0.0186)  (0.0315)  (0.0298)  (0.0294) 
FG     -0.369     -3.342       
      (0.326)     (2.777)       
FG Assets        -0.101     6.342  1.737 
         (1.033)     (4.731)  (4.943) 
FG Liab.        -0.692     -10.67**    
         (1.117)     (5.170)    
Equity Liab.                 5.398 
                  (10.80) 
FDI Liab.                 5.129 
                  (4.990) 
Debt Liab.                 -19.93*** 
                  (3.432) 
Constant  -1.854  -1.938  -1.981  -2.142  -1.856  -1.773 
   (1.834)  (1.812)  (1.793)  (2.918)  (3.202)  (2.470) 
                    
Observations  72  72  72  29  29  29 
R-squared  0.141  0.154  0.155  0.152  0.249  0.507 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Growth collapse is measured as growth in 2009 minus average growth in 2003-2007. All FG variables are 











 Table A1. List of Countries 
AM  PCE  EM  G5  FM 
Australia  Australia  Argentina  France  Bahrain 
Austria  Canada  Brazil  Germany  Bangladesh 
Belgium  New Zealand  Bulgaria  Italy  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Canada  Norway  Chile  Japan  Botswana 
Denmark  Sweden  China  United States  Croatia 
Finland     Colombia     Ghana 
France     Czech Republic     Jordan 
Germany     Ecuador     Kazakhstan 
Greece     Egypt, Arab Rep.     Kenya 
Iceland     Estonia     Kuwait 
Ireland     Hungary     Lebanon 
Italy     India     Mauritius 
Japan     Indonesia     Nigeria 
Netherlands     Israel     Oman 
New Zealand     Korea, Rep.     Pakistan 
Norway     Latvia     Qatar 
Portugal     Lithuania     Saudi Arabia 
Spain     Malaysia     Serbia 
Sweden     Mexico     Slovenia 
Switzerland     Peru     Sri Lanka 
United Kingdom     Philippines     Trinidad and Tobago 
United States     Poland     Tunisia 
      Romania     United Arab Emirates 
      Russian Federation       
      South Africa       
      Thailand       
      Turkey       
      Ukraine       
      Uruguay       
      Venezuela, RB       
      Vietnam       
 
 